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ABSTRACT
We consider the problem faced by a company that wants to
use viral marketing to introduce a new product into a market
where a competing product is already being introduced. We
assume that consumers will use only one of the two products
and will inﬂuence their friends in their decision of which
product to use. We propose two models for the spread of
inﬂuence of competing technologies through a social network
and consider the inﬂuence maximization problem from the
follower’s perspective. In particular we assume the follower
has a ﬁxed budget available that can be used to target a
subset of consumers and show that, although it is NP-hard
to select the most inﬂuential subset to target, it is possible
to give an eﬃcient algorithm that is within 63% of optimal.
We further generalize these results to the case when the
costs of targeting particular consumers are nonuniform. Our
computational experiments show that by using knowledge of
the social network and the set of consumers targeted by the
competitor, the follower may in fact capture a majority of
the market by targeting a relatively small set of the right
consumers.
Keywords
Approximation Algorithms, Social Networks, Viral Market-
ing, Network Analysis, Targeted Marketing
1. INTRODUCTION
The spread of a new idea or product is often studied by
modeling a social network as a graph where the nodes rep-
resent individuals, and edges represent interactions between
individuals. These interactions could include the recommen-
dation of a particular product and such recommendation
networks and their eﬀects on consumer purchasing have re-
cently been analyzed in [15] and [16]. Further, there has
been recent statistical support that such network linkage
can directly aﬀect product adoption [9]. Based on these em-
pirical studies, we can formulate assumptions on how people
aﬀect the people they interact with. We can then use these
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graphs to answer questions such as: “If customers inﬂuence
each other in their decisions to buy products, which cus-
tomers should be targeted to maximize the expected proﬁt
of a new product?” and “How large of a consumer base needs
to be targeted for a new technology, product, or idea to cap-
ture a signiﬁcant share of the market?”
Motivated by the declining eﬀectiveness of traditional mass
marketing techniques [15], many recent papers have studied
these and similar types of questions. The algorithmic prob-
lem of designing viral marketing strategies, marketing tech-
niques which exploit pre-existing social networks to reach
consumers, was studied by Richardson and Domingos [21],
and Kempe, Kleinberg and Tardos ([12] and [13]). Their
research builds on a “word-of-mouth” approach examined
in a marketing context by Goldenberg et al. in [8]. In the
aforementioned works, the producer of a new product is as-
sumed to have the ability to “inﬂuence” a particular set of
consumers within the social network – either through tar-
geted advertising, providing free samples, or adding mone-
tary incentive – to adopt the new product. If these people
inﬂuence some of their friends to also try the product, and
these friends in turn recommend it to others, and so forth,
the producer can create a cascade of recommendations. The
question then becomes how to choose an initial subset of so-
called early adopters to maximize the number of people that
will eventually be reached, and hence be likely to purchase
the product. The size of the subsets allowed is assumed to be
limited due to marketing budget constraints. Kempe et al.
develop general models for the spreading of inﬂuence, show
that ﬁnding the most inﬂuential set of nodes is NP-hard, and
give an approximation algorithm for ﬁnding a set of nodes
that approximately maximizes the expected inﬂuence.
The models developed by Kempe et al. assume that there
is only one company introducing a product. However, pro-
ducers of consumer technologies often must introduce a new
product into a market where a competitor will oﬀer a com-
parable product. The introduction of Nintendo’s Wii, to
compete with Sony’s Playstation 3, and Blu-ray discs, com-
peting with Microsoft’s HD DVD, are recent canonical ex-
amples of such behavior. When adoption of the technology
is not free, it is unlikely that a typical consumer will use both
products. Furthermore, even if a competing product is supe-
rior, consumers are often reluctant to switch technologies if
they must bear a cost of transition which may outweigh any
direct beneﬁts of the technology [6]. The question whetherin this setting a competing product can survive and will be
adopted by a signiﬁcant fraction of the market, or if it will
eventually disappear, has been studied in numerous works,
including [10], [17], and [23].
It is not always the case that the product with the largest
number of early adopters can translate this initial edge into
market dominance. A classical example where such tipping
did occur is the demise of the BETA format due to the VHS
format’s initial popularity. However, Katz and Shapiro note
that consumer heterogeneity coupled with distinct features
of rival products tends to limit tipping in markets where con-
sumers care more about a product’s features than its overall
prevalence [11]. Hence it is an interesting question to con-
sider how a company with a smaller marketing budget may
eﬀectively inﬁltrate a market in which a stronger competing
company is also present.
Historically, competition between two products has largely
been addressed from an economic modeling perspective and
focused on areas such as market equilibrium. For exam-
ple, in [2] and [3], primarily network-independent properties
are employed to model the propagation of two technologies
through a market. Tomochi et al. [23] oﬀer a more game-
theoretic approach which relies on the network for spatial
coordination games. However, they do not address the prob-
lem of taking advantage of the social network and viral mar-
keting when introducing a new technology into a market.
In this paper, we study the algorithmic problem of how to
introduce a new product into an environment where a com-
peting product is also being introduced. We focus on the
case when a company can keep itself hidden from a com-
petitor until the moment of introduction. We assume that
the company has a ﬁxed budget for targeting consumers
and knows who its competitor’s early adopters are – either
through extensive market research or industrial espionage.
We ﬁrst develop two models for the spread of adoption of
the two products through the network. We show that ﬁnd-
ing the most inﬂuential set of a given size for the company
to target – the set that maximizes the expected number of
people that will adopt the new product – is NP-hard under
the proposed models in this setting. From a game theoretic
point-of-view, this can also be viewed as calculating the com-
pany’s best response to a competitor’s move in a Stackelberg
game [7].
Following Kempe et al. we show that using well known
results on submodular functions [18], we can give a (1−
1
e −
ε)-approximation algorithm for ﬁnding the most inﬂuential
set of nodes. Additionally, using a result of Sviridenko [22],
we generalize the allowed subsets to be limited based upon
cost rather than simply size, hence allowing diﬀerent costs to
be associated with targeting diﬀerent subsets of customers.
We will empirically show that a company can obtain a larger
market share than its unsuspecting competitor even if the
competitor has a much larger marketing budget. Further,
we show that knowing who the competitor’s early adopters
are, hence being able to apply our algorithm, will allow the
company to capture a given percentage of the market using
a much smaller marketing budget.
In the sequel we use the words technology and product
synonymously. We discuss useful results from related work
in Section 2. Building on these results, we describe the mod-
els we developed for the spread of two competing technolo-
gies in Section 3 and the results derived for these models in
Section 4. In Section 5 we give the results of some numerical
simulations of the behavior of these models, and we present
conclusions and further research directions in Section 6.
2. BACKGROUND
We begin by recalling some existing results central to the
present work.
Submodular function maximization: Given a ground
set V , a function f : 2
V → R is said to be submodular if
f(S ∪ {v}) − f(S) ≥ f(T ∪ {v}) − f(T) for all v ∈ V and
sets S ⊆ T ⊆ V . We further say that f is monotone if
f(S ∪ {v}) ≥ f(S) for all v ∈ V and subsets S ⊆ V .
For a non-negative, submodular, and monotone function
f, and the optimization problem
max{f(I) : |I| = k,I ⊆ V }, (1)
the greedy Hill Climbing Algorithm repeatedly adds the ele-
ment from V that gives the greatest improvement, by solving
max{f(I ∪ {v}) : v ∈ V − I} (2)
until |I| = k. In [18] Nemhauser et al. show that hill climb-
ing yields a
 
1 −
1
e
 
-approximation: if I is the set found by
the Hill Climbing Algorithm, and I
∗ maximizes (1), then
f(I) ≥
 
1 −
1
e
 
f(I
∗). This result has been extended [12] to
show that for any ε > 0, there is a γ > 0 such that when
using a (1 + γ)-approximation of f( ) in (2), we obtain a
(1 −
1
e − ε)-approximation.
Sviridenko recently generalized the result from Nemhauser
et al. to include problems of the form (1) with an additional
knapsack-type constraint [22]. In particular, for a set of
non-negative weights {ci : i ∈ V } and a budget B ≥ 0, we
now consider the problem:
max
 
f(I) :
 
i∈I
ci ≤ B,I ⊆ V
 
, (3)
where f is again a non-negative, submodular, and mono-
tone set function. An extension of hill climbing, iteratively
adding to I elements v ∈ V − I which maximize
max
 
f(I ∪ {v}) − f(I)
cv
: cv +
 
i∈I
ci ≤ B
 
, (4)
until cv > B −
 
i∈I ci for all v ∈ V −I, is described in [14].
Sviridenko showed that this version of hill climbing yields a  
1 −
1
e
 
-approximation to (3).
Inﬂuence maximization on a network in the single
technology case: The spread of a single technology through
a network has been approached using diﬀerent diﬀusion mod-
els (see for example [12], [13], [21], [24]). Here we describe
the independent cascade model introduced by Kempe et al.
[12] which resembles the models we will develop in the case
of competing technologies.
We assume some set of nodes I initially uses the tech-
nology. The diﬀusion process then unfolds in discrete time
steps. When a node u ﬁrst adopts the technology, it gets a
single chance to make its neighbor v adopt the technology.
It succeeds with probability puv independently of the history
so far. In the next time step, the nodes which just adopted
the technology get a chance to inﬂuence their neighbors and
so on. Note that the process is progressive: once a node hasadopted the technology, it will not go back to the state of
not having adopted it.
The quantity of interest is then the inﬂuence function
σ(I), signifying the expected number of nodes that even-
tually adopt the technology given the initial set of adopters
I. In [12] Kempe et al. address how to choose an initial
set I of some ﬁxed size k to maximize σ(I). Kempe et al.
previously showed that solving (1) when f is the inﬂuence
function σ is NP-hard but that σ is submodular. Hence if σ
can be approximated (say with numerical simulations) arbi-
trarily well, then for any given ε > 0, hill climbing gives a  
1 −
1
e − ε
 
-approximation algorithm for ﬁnding an inﬂuen-
tial initial k-set I.
Our results: We propose two models for the simultane-
ous diﬀusion of two competing technologies on any network
given an initial set of early adopters for each technology. In-
ﬂuence functions σ(IA|IB) are deﬁned to quantify the suc-
cess of a technology’s choice of initial adopters. While the
proposed models for diﬀusion are conceptually simple, we
show that maximizing such inﬂuence functions subject to
a budget is computationally intractable. However, in each
case we are able to show that the inﬂuence function is non-
negative, submodular, and monotone, and hence hill climb-
ing provides an approximation algorithm. We have also gen-
eralized these results to address heterogeneous costs for tar-
geting consumers.
3. MODELING THE DIFFUSION OF TWO
TECHNOLOGIES
We now extend the independent cascade model to the case
of two competing technologies. In particular, we propose
two models for describing how two technologies simultane-
ously diﬀuse over a given network.
Consumers are again modeled as nodes in a network and
links between nodes represent interaction between consumers.
We assume that our network is an undirected graph G =
(V,E) with |V | = n nodes and |E| = m edges. Nodes can
take on one of three states – A and B referring to the two
technologies of interest, and C denoting that neither tech-
nology is adopted. We can specify two initial sets of nodes
– a set of initial adopters of A, IA ⊆ V , and a set of initial
adopters of B, IB ⊆ V (with the implicit assumption that
IC = V − (IA ∪ IB)). We assume that IA ∩ IB = ∅. We
assume that once a node has chosen a technology, it will
not change to another technology, but that nodes that are
using one of the two technologies can inﬂuence their neigh-
bors that are not using either technology in their decisions
to adopt one of the two technologies.
As in the independent cascade model for a single tech-
nology, we assume that if u has adopted a particular tech-
nology, then u inﬂuences neighbor v with probability puv.
Henceforth, we say that an edge is “active” with probability
puv independently of the history so far. However, it is now
possible that v is inﬂuenced by multiple neighbors that use
diﬀerent technologies. We will propose two models that gov-
ern this “diﬀusion” of technologies A and B, starting from
the sets of initial adopters, given the set of active edges of
the network. In other words, the models we develop operate
on a random subgraph of the social network G, where each
edge is included independently with probability puv.
Given such a diﬀusion model, and the assumption that
initially a set of consumers, IB, is already using technology
B, company A would like to choose a set of k consumers,
IA, to target so as to maximize the expected number of
consumers reached eventually.
Let the inﬂuence function f(IA|IB) be the expected num-
ber of consumers that will adopt technology A, given that
initially the set IA is using technology A and the set IB is
using technology B. We are hence after a solution of the
inﬂuence maximization problem:
max{f(IA|IB) : IA ⊆ V − IB,|IA| = k}. (5)
If the cost of targeting consumers varies from consumer to
consumer, a company may instead wish to maximize its rev-
enue subject to some budget B. Given non-negative costs
{ci : i ∈ V }, the more general from of (5) is then:
max



f(IA|IB) : IA ⊆ V − IB,
 
i∈IA
ci ≤ B



. (6)
For ease of exposition, throughout the sequel we suppress
these costs and will assume that cv = 1 for all v ∈ V .
3.1 A Distance-based model
Our ﬁrst model is related to competitive facility location
[5] on a network. In this model, the location of a node in the
network is important, as well as the connectivity of a node.
The idea is that a consumer will be more likely to mimic the
behavior of an early adopter if their distance in the social
network is small.
We assume that for each edge (u,v) ∈ E, we are also
given a length duv. If no length is speciﬁed we assume that
all edges have length 1. In the following we will assume
all edges have length 1, however the results can easily be
extended for arbitrary non-negative edge lengths. We let
I = IA ∪ IB be the set of all initial adopters.
Let du(I,Ea) denote the shortest distance from u to I
along the edges in Ea, with the notation du(I,Ea) = ∞
1
if and only if u is not connected to any node of I using
only active edges. If du(I,Ea) < ∞, let νu(IA,du(I,Ea))
and νu(IB,du(I,Ea)) be the number of nodes in IA and IB,
respectively, at distance du(I,Ea) from u along edges in Ea.
Given that du(I,Ea) is the shortest distance from u to I
along the active edges of G, we will say that node u adopts
technology i ∈ {A,B} with probability
νu(Ii,du(I,Ea))
νu(IA,du(I,Ea)) + νu(IB,du(I,Ea))
. (7)
Note that – conditioned on set Ea – node u is thus only inﬂu-
enced by nodes in IA and IB that are at distance du(I,Ea).
We note that these are well-deﬁned (conditional) probabili-
ties that sum to one, since at least one of νu(IA,du(I,Ea))
and νu(IB,du(I,Ea)) is strictly positive.
In this model the expected number of nodes which adopt
A will be denoted by
ρ(IA|IB) = E
 
 
u∈V
νu(IA,du(I,Ea))
νu(IA,du(I,Ea)) + νu(IB,du(I,Ea))
 
,
1If du(I,Ea) = ∞, we say that u will adopt neither tech-
nology (state C) because it is not connected to any of the
initial adopters by active edges. Henceforth, we assume that
any node u under consideration is connected to some v ∈ I
in G.B
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Figure 1: Given the set of active edges drawn, the probabil-
ity that node v adopts technology A is
2
3 in the distance-based
model, and
1
2 in the wave propagation model.
where the expectation is over the set of active edges. We ﬁx
IB and try to determine IA so as to maximize the expected
number of nodes that adopt technology A:
max{ρ(IA|IB) : IA ⊆ (V − IB),|IA| = k}. (8)
3.2 Wave propagation model
Although both of the models we propose here reduce to
the independent cascade model of Kempe et al. [12] if there
is no competition (if we let IB = ∅), our second model for
propagation is closer in spirit to the independent cascade
model. We motivate this model through the example shown
in Figure 1.
In this example, with the edges shown being active, our
previous distance-based model gives node v a probability of
2
3 of adopting technology A, even though it has only two
neighbors, one of which adopts technology A and one of
which adopts technology B. Under the alternative model
presented here a node copies the technology adoption of a
neighboring node randomly chosen from the set of its neigh-
bors that are closest to the initial sets (IA,IB). In the ex-
ample, and given the set of active edges shown, this corre-
sponds to giving node v a probability
1
2 of adopting A and
1
2 of adopting B.
We can think of the propagation as happening in discrete
steps. In step d, all nodes that are at distance at most d−1
from some node in the initial sets have adopted technology
A or B, and all nodes for which the closest initial node
is farther than d − 1 do not have a technology yet (where
the distance is again with respect to active edges). The
nodes at a distance d from the initial sets now choose one
of their neighbors that are at distance d − 1 independently
at random, and adopt the same technology as this neighbor.
As in the previous section, we assume that the node under
consideration is in the same connected component of at least
one of the nodes u ∈ I.
Formally, let P(v|IA,IB,Ea) be the probability that node
v adopts technology A when the initial sets for technologies
A and B are IA and IB, respectively, and the set of active
edges is Ea. Let u be a node for which the closest node in
I = IA ∪ IB is at distance d. Let S be the set of neighbors
of u that are at distance d − 1 from I, where all distances
are again with respect to active edges. Then
P(u|IA,IB,Ea) =
 
v∈S P(v|IA,IB,Ea)
|S|
.
For initial sets IA,IB, let
π(IA|IB) = E
 
 
v∈V
P(v|IA,IB,Ea)
 
denote the expected number of nodes that adopt technology
A. For ﬁxed IB, we seek a solution to:
max{π(IA|IB) : IA ⊆ (V − IB),|IA| = k}. (9)
4. APPROXIMATION ALGORITHMS FOR
INFLUENCE MAXIMIZATION
For each of the diﬀusion models proposed in Section 3
we now show that the decision versions of (8) and (9) are
NP-hard but that the corresponding inﬂuence functions are
nonnegative, monotone and submodular. It will then follow
from [18] and [22] that we can use a greedy hill-climbing al-
gorithm to get a (1 −
1
e)-approximation algorithm for these
problems. In general it will not be possible to exactly solve
the subproblems (2) and (4), as this requires exact evalua-
tion of ρ( |IB) and π( |IB). However, using simulations we
can get arbitrarily close approximations of the values needed
in (2) and (4). This then allows us to obtain (1 −
1
e − ε)-
approximation algorithms for both models [12].
Theorem 1. For any given IB with |V − IB| ≥ k, the
Hill Climbing Algorithm gives a
 
1 −
1
e − ε
 
-approximation
algorithm for (8).
Proof. Given inputs (IA,IB), and a set of active edges
Ea, ρ(IA|IB) can be eﬃciently evaluated using Algorithm A
provided in the Appendix. The algorithm relies on a single
all-pairs shortest paths computation and has overall com-
plexity O(|V |
3). Using simulations, we can then approxi-
mate ρ(IA|IB) = E[ρ(IA|IB)|Ea] to within (1 + γ) for any
γ > 0 (where the running time depends on
1
γ). Hence we can
implement the greedy hill-climbing algorithm using (1+γ)-
approximate values for ρ(IA ∪ {v}|IB) in polynomial time.
Monotonicity and submodularity of ρ( |IB) will be shown in
Lemma 2 and Lemma 3, respectively. The approximation
guarantee is then an immediate consequence of the results
in Section 2.
Theorem 2. For any given IB with |V − IB| ≥ k, the
Hill Climbing Algorithm gives a
 
1 −
1
e − ε
 
-approximation
algorithm for (9).
Proof. Given inputs (IA,IB) and a set of active edges
Ea, π(IA|IB) can be eﬃciently evaluated using Algorithm
B in the Appendix. The algorithm relies on a single all-
pairs shortest path computation and has overall complexity
O(|V |
3). We can approximate π(IA|IB) = E[π(IA|IB)|Ea]
to within (1 + γ) for any γ > 0, hence we can implement
the greedy hill-climbing algorithm using (1+γ)-approximate
values for π(IA ∪ {v}|IB) in polynomial time. Monotonic-
ity and submodularity of π( |IB) will be shown Lemma 5
and Lemma 6, respectively. The approximation guarantee
is again an immediate consequence of the results in Sec-
tion 2.x
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Figure 2: Graph H for set cover reduction.
Before proceeding, we note that to show NP-hardness and
the desired properties of the inﬂuence functions, it suﬃces to
consider the case when puv = 1 for all edges (or equivalently,
Ea = E): NP-hardness of a special case clearly implies NP-
hardness of the more general case, and the expected value of
a function of Ea is nonnegative, monotone, and submodular
if for any Ea the function is nonnegative, monotone, and
submodular. For ease of exposition, we therefore restrict
ourselves to this special case in the remainder of this section.
4.1 A Distance-based model
Let the decision version of (8) be to determine if there is
a set IA of size k with ρ(IA|IB) ≥ M for any M ∈ Q. We
then have the following result.
Theorem 3. The decision version of (8) is NP-hard.
Proof. Given a ground set of elements E = {ei : 1 ≤ i ≤
n} and a collection of sets S = {si : 1 ≤ i ≤ m} such that
each si ⊆ E, the decision version of the set cover problem
asks if there is a collection of k sets covering all elements
in E. Without loss of generality we assume that every ele-
ment is covered by at least one set and that k < min(m,n).
We reduce the NP-hard set cover decision problem to the
decision version of (8).
Given an instance (S,E,k) of set cover, we construct a
graph H as follows. We add a node si for each set si ∈ S
and a node ej for each element ej ∈ E. We add an edge
(si,ej) if and only if ej ∈ si. We add an additional node
x and connect it to each ej through another node dj (see
Figure 2). Lastly, for a constant κ > 0 to be speciﬁed in the
subsequent lemma, we construct a cluster Cj of κ nodes for
each j = 1,...,n and connect each of the nodes in Cj to ej.
The following lemma completes the reduction by specifying
the value of κ.
Lemma 1. Let κ > (k + 1)(m + n) and IB = {x}. There
is a collection of k sets which cover E if and only if there
is a set IA of k nodes in the graph H such that ρ(IA|IB) ≥
n(κ + 1).
Proof. If there a collection of k sets covering E then
take IA to be the k nodes corresponding to those sets. This
gives ρ(IA|IB) ≥ n(κ + 1) by the following argument. Each
of the nodes ej is adjacent to one of the nodes in IA since
the corresponding sets form a cover. Each ej and the nodes
in each cluster Cj adopt A with probability one since initial
adopters of A are the closest for these nodes. This results
in at least n(κ + 1) nodes with technology A.
If there is no collection of k sets that cover E then we prove
that no set IA of k nodes can be the initial adopters of A
and still achieve ρ(IA|IB) ≥ n(κ + 1). Consider the nodes
e1,...,en. There exists a node ej which adopts technology B
with probability at least
1
k+1 since any set IA of size k cannot
be within a distance of 1 from all ei (by the construction of
H and lack of a cover). This implies that ej and all nodes
in Cj adopt technology B with probability at least
1
k+1. So
ρ(IA|IB)
≤ (n −
1
k + 1
)(κ + 1)
      
from e1,...,en and C1,...,Cn
+ m + n       
from s1,...,sm and d1,...,dn
= n(κ + 1) + (m + n) −
1
k + 1
(κ + 1) < n(κ + 1).
Having shown the hardness of (8), we now turn to the
Lemmas required in Theorem 1 and show that the inﬂuence
function ρ is both monotone and submodular. We assume
without loss of generality that every edge is active with prob-
ability 1, and for ease of notation, we will write du(I) in-
stead of du(I,Ea). Furthermore, we will drop the subscript
u when u is clear from the context.
Lemma 2. For any IB, ρ(IA|IB) is a monotone function
of IA.
Proof. For a ﬁxed u ∈ V and initial set IB, it suﬃces to
show for any v ∈ V − IB, and any IA ⊆ V , the probability
that u adopts A given the initial set IA is at most the prob-
ability that u adopts A when the initial set is IA ∪{v}, that
is:
ν(IA,d(I))
ν(IA,d(I)) + ν(IB,d(I))
≤
ν(IA ∪ {v},d(I ∪ {v}))
ν(IA ∪ {v},d(I ∪ {v})) + ν(IB,d(I ∪ {v}))
.
We note that the shortest distance from u to a node in I
is not smaller than the shortest distance from u to a node
in I ∪ {v}, so d(I) ≥ d(I ∪ {v}).
Now, if d(I∪{v}) < d(I), then ν(IB,d(I∪{v})) = 0, so the
right hand side is 1, and the inequality clearly holds. Oth-
erwise, ν(IB,d(I ∪ {v})) = ν(IB,d(I)), and ν(IA,d(I)) =
ν(IA,d(I ∪ {v})) ≤ ν(IA ∪ {v},d(I ∪ {v}) and the inequal-
ity holds since for real numbers c ≥ a ≥ 0 and b > 0,
c
c+b ≥
a
a+b.
Lemma 3. For any IB, ρ(IA|IB) is a submodular function
of IA.
Proof. For a set of initial adopters of A, S, and a node
x ∈ V − (S ∪ IB), we deﬁne the increase in the probabilitythat node u adopts technology A when adding x to the initial
set S as:
P(u,S,x)
=
ν(S ∪ {x},d(S ∪ {x} ∪ IB))
ν(S ∪ {x},d(S ∪ {x} ∪ IB)) + ν(IB,d(S ∪ {x} ∪ IB))
−
ν(S,d(S ∪ IB))
ν(S,d(S ∪ IB)) + ν(IB,d(S ∪ IB))
.
We need to show that for any node u ∈ V and S ⊆ T ⊆ V ,
P(u,S,x) ≥ P(u,T,x).
Let d1 = d(S), d2 = d(T), d3 = d(IB). Since S ⊆ T,
d1 ≥ d2. We analyze three cases:
Case 1 (d1 ≥ d2 ≥ d3): If d(u,x) > d3, adding x does
not change the probability of u adopting A. So P(u,S,x) =
P(u,T,x) = 0. If d(u,x) < d3, then adding x makes u adopt
A with probability 1. It then follows from the monotonicity
of ρ that
P(u,S,x) = 1 −
ν(S,d(S ∪ IB))
ν(S,d(S ∪ IB)) + ν(IB,d(S ∪ IB))
≥ 1 −
ν(T,d(T ∪ IB))
ν(T,d(T ∪ IB)) + ν(IB,d(T ∪ IB))
= P(u,T,x).
If d(u,x) = d3, then ν(S,d(S∪IB)) = ν(S,d3) and ν(T,d(T∪
IB)) = ν(T,d3) and these both increase by 1 if x is added.
Furthermore ν(IB,d(X ∪ IB)) = ν(IB,d3) for X ∈ {S,S ∪
{x},T,T ∪ {x}}. So we need to show that
ν(S,d3) + 1
ν(S,d3) + 1 + ν(IB,d3)
−
ν(S,d3)
ν(S,d3) + ν(IB,d3)
≥
ν(T,d3) + 1
ν(T,d3) + 1 + ν(IB,d3)
−
ν(T,d3)
ν(T,d3) + ν(IB,d3)
.
This equation can be easily checked to be true using the fact
that ν(S,d3) ≤ ν(T,d3).
Case 2 (d3 > d1 ≥ d2): In this case ν(IB,d(X∪IB)) = 0 for
X ∈ {S,S∪{x},T,T∪{x}}. In this case the probability that
u adopts A is 1 for initial sets X ∈ {S,S ∪{x},T,T ∪{x}},
so P(u,S,x) = P(u,T,x) = 0.
Case 3 (d1 ≥ d3 > d2): Since d3 > d2, u will adopt technol-
ogy A with probability 1 if the initial set is T or T ∪{x}. So
P(u,T,x) = 0, and P(u,S,x) ≥ 0 holds by Lemma 2.
4.2 Wave propagation model
Since it suﬃces to show that π(IA|IB) is monotone and
submodular in the special case that every edge in the graph
is active with probability 1, we will restrict ourselves to this
case and write P(u,IA,IB) instead of P(u|IA,IB,Ea) for the
probability that node u adopts technology A when the initial
sets for technology A and B are IA and IB, respectively and
the set of active edges is Ea.
Let the decision version of (9) be to determine if there is
a set IA of size k with π(IA|IB) ≥ M for any M ∈ Q. We
then have the following result.
Theorem 4. The decision version of (9) is NP-hard.
Proof. We reduce the NP-hard set cover decision prob-
lem to the decision version of (9) as in Theorem 3. Given an
instance (S,E,k) of set cover, we construct the same graph
H constructed in the proof of Theorem 3. The following
lemma completes the proof.
Lemma 4. Let κ > (m+1)(m+n) and IB = {x}. There
is a collection of k sets which cover E if and only if there
is a set IA of k nodes in the graph H such that π(IA|IB) ≥
n(κ + 1).
Proof. If there a collection of k sets covering E then
take IA to be the k nodes corresponding to those sets. This
gives π(IA|IB) ≥ n(κ + 1) by the same argument given in
the proof of Lemma 1.
If there is no collection of k sets that cover E then we
prove that no set IA of k nodes can be the initial adopters
of A and still achieve π(IA|IB) ≥ n(κ + 1). Consider the
nodes e1,...,en. Any set IA of size k cannot be within a
distance of 1 from all ej (by the construction of H and lack of
a cover). So there exists a node ej which adopts technology
B with probability at least
1
m+1 because one of its neighbors
dj has P(dj|IA,IB) = 0 and is at distance 1 from I and at
most m + 1 of its neighbors are at distance 1 from I. So
P(ej|IA,IB) ≤
m
m+1. This implies that ej and all the nodes
in Cj adopt technology A with probability at most
m
m+1. So
for any initial set IA of size k,
π(IA|IB) ≤
 
v∈V
P(v,IA,IB)
≤ (m + n)
      
for v∈{s1,...,sm}∪{d1,...,dn}
+(n − 1)(κ + 1)
      
for v∈ei∪Ci,i =j
+(κ + 1)P(ej|IA,IB)
      
v∈ej∪Cj
≤ (m + n) + (n − 1)(κ + 1) + (κ + 1)
m
m + 1
< (n − 1)(κ + 1) + (m + 1)(m + n)
< n(κ + 1).
We again beneﬁt from the valuable properties of mono-
tonicity and submodularity.
Lemma 5. For any IB, π(IA|IB) is a monotone function
of IA.
Proof. To prove monotonicity we need to show that
P(u|S ∪ x,IB) ≥ P(u|S,IB) for all x ∈ V − IB. We em-
ploy the same notation as in Section 4.1 and let n(v) =
{u : (u,v) ∈ E} denote the neighbors of node v. Note that
d(u,S∪x∪IB) ≤ d(u,S∪IB). If d(u,S∪x∪IB) < d(u,S∪IB)
then P(u|S ∪ x,IB) = 1 ≥ P(u|S,IB) which proves mono-
tonicity. So the interesting case is when d(u,S ∪ x ∪ IB) =
d(u,S ∪ IB). We prove P(u|S ∪ x,IB) ≥ P(u|S,IB) for this
case by induction on the distance d = d(u,S ∪ IB).
Base case: d = 1. If x is not a neighbor of u then P(u|S ∪
x,IB) = P(u|S,IB). If x is a neighbor of u then P(u|S ∪
x,IB) =
1+|n(u)∩S|
1+|n(u)∩(S∪IB)| ≥
|n(u)∩S|
|n(u)∩(S∪IB)| = P(u|S,IB).
Induction step: Now we prove monotonicity for nodes u
such that d(u,S∪IB) = d assuming monotonicity for all the
nodes v with d(v,S ∪IB) < d. Let S be the set of neighbors
of u which are at a distance d − 1 from S ∪ IB. Let K be
the set of neighbors of u which are at a distance d − 1 from
x but at a distance greater than d − 1 from S ∪ IB. Let
K = |K|. Note that all v ∈ K have P(v|S ∪ x,IB) = 1. Theprobability of u accepting technology A is then:
P(u|S ∪ x,IB) =
K +
 
v∈S P(v|S ∪ x,IB)
K + |S|
≥
 
v∈S P(v|S ∪ x,IB)
|S|
≥
 
v∈S P(v|S,IB)
|S|
= P(u|S,IB).
The second inequality follows from the induction assumption
that monotonicity holds for the nodes v with d(v,S∪IB) < d
and the fact that all nodes in S are at a distance d−1 from
S ∪ IB.
Lemma 6. For any IB, π(IA|IB) is a submodular func-
tion of IA.
Proof. We will show that for two sets S ⊆ T ⊆ V − IB,
and a node x ∈ V − IB, we have that ∀u ∈ V
P(u|S ∪ x,IB) − P(u|S,IB) ≥ P(u|T ∪ x,IB) − P(u|T,IB)
by induction on d = d(u,x). If d = 0, then clearly the in-
equality holds. Suppose it holds for any v such that d(v,x) =
d − 1.
As in the proof of Lemma 3, we consider diﬀerent cases
for the distance from u to the closest node in S, T and
IB. Let d1 = d(u,S),d2 = d(u,T),d3 = d(u,IB). It is
easy to see that the proof of Lemma 3 also works for our
alternative model, except for the case when d1 ≥ d2 ≥ d3
and d3 = d(u,x).
Let S be the set of neighbors of u for whom the closest
node from S ∪ IB is at distance d − 1 so that:
P(u|S,IB) =
 
v∈S P(v|S,IB)
|S|
.
Note that each neighbor of u that is at distance d − 1 from
x but is at distance greater than d − 1 from the nodes in
S ∪ IB, adopts A with probability 1. Let K be the number
of such nodes, then:
P(u|S ∪ x,IB) =
K +
 
v∈S P(v|S ∪ x,IB)
K + |S|
.
Therefore the diﬀerence in the probability of u adopting A
is:
P(u|S ∪ x,IB) − P(u|S,IB)
=
K +
 
v∈S P(v|S ∪ x,IB)
K + |S|
−
 
v∈S P(v|S,IB)
|S|
=
K
K + |S|
+
 
v∈S
P(v|S ∪ x,IB) −
 
v∈S
P(v|S,IB)
K + |S|
−
K
 
v∈S
P(v|S,IB)
(K + |S|)|S|
=
 
v∈S(P(v|S ∪ x,IB) − P(v|S,IB))
K + |S|
+
K
K + |S|
 
v∈S(1 − P(v|S,IB))
|S|
.
Similarly, let T be the set of neighbors of u for whom the
closest node from T ∪ IB is at distance d − 1, and let L be
the number of neighbors of u that are at distance d−1 from
x, and at distance greater than d − 1 from T ∪ IB. Then:
P(u|T ∪ x,IB) − P(u|T,IB)
=
 
v∈T (P(v|T ∪ x,IB) − P(v|T,IB))
L + |T |
+
L
L + |T |
 
v∈T (1 − P(v|T,IB))
|T |
We now establish the following three inequalities:
K
K + |S|
≥
L
L + |T |
(10)
 
v∈S(P(v|S ∪ x,IB) − P(v|S,IB))
K + |S|
≥
 
v∈T (P(v|T ∪ x,IB) − P(v|T,IB))
L + |T |
(11)
 
v∈S(1 − P(v|S,IB))
|S|
≥
 
v∈T (1 − P(v|T,IB))
|T |
(12)
Clearly these inequalities imply that
P(u|S ∪ x,IB) − P(u|S,IB) ≥ P(u|T ∪ x,IB) − P(u|T,IB).
To prove (10), let K and L be the set of neighbors of u that
are at distance d−1 from x, and at distance greater than d−1
from S∪IB and T ∪IB, respectively. (So K = |K|,L = |L|).
Since S ⊆ T, we have K ⊇ L and hence K ≥ L. Now,
T ∪ L is the set of neighbors of u that are at distance d − 1
from T ∪ x∪ IB, and S ∪K is the set of neighbors of u that
are at distance d − 1 from S ∪ x ∪ IB, so S ∪ K ⊆ T ∪ L.
Since T ∩ L = S ∩ K = ∅, we get that K + |S| ≤ L + |T |.
Combining this with K ≥ L we obtain (10).
To prove (11), we note that for v ∈ T − S, we must have
P(v|T,IB) = P(v|T ∪ x,IB) = 1. Since v  ∈ S, the shortest
distance from v to any node in IB is greater than d−1, and
since v ∈ T , there must be a node in T that is at distance
d − 1 from v. Hence:
 
v∈T
[P(v|T ∪ x,IB) − P(v|T,IB)]
=
 
v∈S
[P(v|T ∪ x,IB) − P(v|T,IB)]
≥
 
v∈S
[P(v|S ∪ x,IB) − P(v|S,IB)],
where the inequality follows from induction. We established
above that K +|S| ≤ L+|T |, which completes the proof of
(11).
For (12), we again use the fact that P(v|T,IB) = 0 for
v ∈ T − S and obtain:
 
v∈T
[1 − P(v|T,IB)] =
 
v∈S
[1 − P(v|T,IB)]
≤
 
v∈S
[1 − P(v|S,IB)],
where the inequality follows from monotonicity. The fact
that |T | ≥ |S| gives (12).0 20 40 60 80 100
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Figure 3: Distance-based model: random IB, puv = .1
5. NUMERICAL SIMULATIONS
In this section we analyze the behavior of both models
and the resulting inﬂuence sets of each on a real network –
the coauthorship graph based on papers in theoretical high-
energy physics. Empirical evidence suggests that coauthor-
ship graphs are representative of typical social networks [19].
By choosing to run our experiments on the data from an ac-
tual social network as opposed to generating random graphs,
we are able to obtain results that are more speciﬁcally ap-
plicable to the motivations for our models.
The speciﬁc dataset we employed was the PROXIMITY
HEP-Th database based on data from the arXiv archive
and the Stanford Linear Accelerator Center SPIRES-HEP
database provided for the 2003 KDD Cup competition with
additional preparation performed by the Knowledge Discov-
ery Laboratory, University of Massachusetts Amherst [20].
After minor preprocessing, the network consisted of 8392
distinct authors and 461 separate connected components (of
size at least 2), the largest of which contained 7034 authors.
We ran simulations of the greedy Hill Climbing Algorithm
on this network, where the IB set was chosen according to
several diﬀerent heuristics. As discussed in [12] the heuris-
tics of choosing high-degree nodes and central nodes are of-
ten used in the sociology literature to ﬁnd inﬂuential sets of
nodes. Here the high-degree heuristic chooses nodes in order
of highest degree, while the central node heuristic chooses
nodes with low average distance to other nodes. The aver-
age distance is calculated by taking the average of a node’s
distance to all other nodes, where the distance between un-
connected nodes is the number of nodes in the graph. In ad-
dition to these two heuristics, we also ran simulations where
the nodes of IB are chosen from V uniformly at random.
We used each of these three heuristics to choose an initial
set IB of ﬁxed size |IB| = 100 corresponding to a little more
than 1% of the nodes in the network. For each of these IB
sets, we ran the greedy Hill Climbing Algorithm to deter-
mine the most inﬂuential IA set, where |IA| ranged from 1
to 100 nodes. Since the problem of ﬁnding the best IA of
a ﬁxed size is NP-complete, we compare the results of the
algorithm against three heuristics for choosing the IA set
from V − IB: high-degree nodes, central nodes, and nodes
0 20 40 60 80 100
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
800
900
k = |I
A|
S
i
z
e
 
o
f
 
A
c
t
i
v
e
 
S
e
t
 
f
o
r
 
A
 
 
Greedy
High Degree
Central
Random
Figure 4: Distance-based model: greedy IB, puv = .1
uniformly at random.
As in Kempe et al. [12], we begin by giving each edge
(u,v) in the network a probability puv = .1 of being active.
We suppress the details of the simulation procedure em-
ployed, but note here that when puv ∈ (0,1), many random
subgraphs must be generated to both obtain a node with
the largest marginal expected inﬂuence and to evaluate the
overall inﬂuence of all methods.
Figure 3 shows the size of the market which product A
captures for increasing values of k = |IA| using the distance-
based model detailed in Section 4.1, where the 100 nodes of
IB are chosen uniformly at random. As shown in Figure 4,
when IB is chosen greedily – following the hill climbing al-
gorithm of Kempe et al. in the single technology setting –
all of the heuristics for choosing IA require many more ini-
tial nodes to capture the same size of the market as when
IB is chosen at random. As expected, from B’s perspective
this greedy choice of IB also outperformed the high-degree
nodes and central nodes heuristics, and hence we ﬁx IB to
be this best choice for B.
In all of the experiments which we conducted, the Hill
Climbing Algorithm outperformed the other heuristics. This
can be attributed to the fact that the Hill Climbing Algo-
rithm takes into account the eﬀect of both the nodes in IB
and the nodes already selected in IA.
Figure 5 shows the percentage of the market captured by
A and B, respectively and in total, for increasing sizes of
IA when using our greedy algorithm for choosing IA in the
distance-based model. Here we see that our approximation
algorithm allows A to capture a larger market share than
B by targeting only 44 consumers (recall that B targeted
100 consumers). Since the growth in the total number of
adopters of A and B is much slower than the growth of
A’s inﬂuence, this ﬁgure shows that A’s increase in market
share is mostly due to drawing consumers away from its
competitor. Thus we see that, by virtue of knowing what
consumers B will target, A is in fact at an advantage in
following its competitor.
Figure 6 shows how much larger an initial set each of
the heuristics require relative to the greedy algorithm’s ini-
tial set to attain some speciﬁed level of inﬂuence. Here we0 20 40 60 80 100
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Figure 5: Percentage of the total market captured
(Distance-based model: greedy IB, puv = .1)
see that to inﬂuence 500 consumers, the high-degree nodes
heuristic requires an initial set which is approximately 1.5
times larger than that required by the greedy algorithm. In
particular, this quantiﬁes how much better the greedy al-
gorithm performs relative to the popular heuristics. This
information could also be used by A to determine the value
of knowing precisely what consumers B will target, since the
other heuristics do not require this knowledge.
The ﬁgures for the results of the wave propagation model
with puv = .1 are similar to those for the distance-based
model, and are hence omitted. We note that the same is true
for the results obtained for the two models when puv = 1,
corresponding to all edges in the graph being active.
This situation arises when edges represent geographical
connections such as in the case of competitive facility lo-
cation and hence we again choose to show results for the
distance-based model. Since interactions are now determin-
istic, the greedy algorithm for ﬁnding IB will iteratively se-
lect one node in the largest untargeted connected compo-
nent. Thus in Figure 7 we consider the resulting inﬂuence
of A when IB is instead chosen using the high-degree nodes
heuristic. We again note behavior similar to that in Fig-
ures 3 and 4 but that the resulting magnitude of inﬂuence
is much greater because of the prevalence of interactions in
the graph.
For the same setting, Figure 8 shows the marginal gain in
inﬂuence which A enjoys from targeting an additional con-
sumer. While the behavior shown can be inferred from the
previous ﬁgure, it is instructive to observe that simply greed-
ily targeting the most inﬂuential consumer yields an approx-
imate expected return of more than 180 eventual adopters.
We note that given costs for targeting consumers, this ﬁg-
ure could help a company decide at what point the cost or
targeting an additional consumer outweighs the marginal re-
turn expected from this action. For example, in the case of
competitive facility location, if opening an additional facil-
ity costs roughly 20 times the proﬁt realized from gaining
an additional customer, according to Figure 8 company A
would choose to open no more than 75 facilities.
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Figure 6: The beneﬁt of knowing IB, (Distance-
based model: greedy IB, puv = .1)
6. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this paper we studied the spreading of two competing
technologies, A and B, in a social network. We addressed
the question of ﬁnding an initial set of nodes to target for
technology A, given that the initial set of nodes adopting
technology B is known. To our knowledge, this work rep-
resents the ﬁrst treatment of such questions. We proposed
two basic models for the spreading of technologies through a
network, in which the two technologies propagate in exactly
the same way. These models and our results can be easily
extended to handle additional competitors. We believe our
results could also be extended to include more general cases,
for example by having diﬀerent acceptance probabilities for
the two technologies, or by allowing the rate at which inﬂu-
ence travels in the graph diﬀer for the two technologies.
From a game-theoretic perspective, the question we study
is that of ﬁnding a best response to the ﬁrst player’s move
in a Stackelberg game. A natural next step would be to
study the optimal behavior of the ﬁrst player, given that
she knows that the second player will use our approximate
best response, and ultimately to study the Nash equilibria of
this Stackelberg game. We believe that, irrespective of B’s
strategy for choosing IB, A can outperform B with a rela-
tively small budget simply by choosing consumers second.
Other interesting games that could be considered using our
models are the simultaneous version of this game, and the
game where the two players take turns in targeting nodes.
Lastly, using our ﬁrst model with edge probabilities equal
to 1, these problems can also be seen in the context of com-
petitive facility location [1, 4] on a network, but we are not
aware of any previous results for competitive location games
on a network.
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A. ALGORITHM A:
Evaluating ρ(IA|IB) for a given Ea
Solve an all-pairs shortest path problem on Ga = (V,Ea).
Let E(i,j) be the length of the shortest i − j path in Ga.
For each v ∈ V
Compute d = minu∈I E(u,v).
Compute νu(IA,d) and νu(IB,d) using Ea.
Let q(v) =
νu(IA,d)
νu(IA,d)+νu(IB,d).
Output ρ(IA|IB) =
 
v∈V q(v).
B. ALGORITHM B:
Evaluating π(IA|IB) for a given Ea
Solve an all-pairs shortest path problem on Ga = (V,Ea).
Let E(i,j) be the length of the shortest i − j path in Ga.
Let IA = {x1,x2,...,xr}.
Let δ(v,S) = minu∈S E(v,u).
Initialize P(v|∅,IB) = 0 ∀v ∈ V
For i = 1,...,r do the following:
P(xi|{x1,...,xi},IB) = 1
For ∆ = 1 : maxu∈V E(xi,u)
While there is an unupdated node v with D(v,xi) = ∆:
Let d = δ(v,{x1,...,xi−1} ∪ IB)
If ∆ < d then
P(v|{x1,...,xi},IB) = 1;
If ∆ > d then
P(v|{x1,...,xi},IB) = P(v|{x1,...,xi−1},IB);
If ∆ = d then let:
S = {u : (u,v) ∈ Ea,δ(u,{x1,...,xi} ∪ IB) = ∆ − 1}.
P(v|{x1,...,xi},IB) =
 
u∈S P(u|{x1,...,xi},IB)
|S|
(Note that all nodes in S are updated before v).
Output π(IA|IB) =
 
v∈V P(v|IA,IB).